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Scope of thellAIter Ego" Exception
By Michael J. Hayes" and Quinn Broverman
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I. Introductlon

hen Illinois employees are the
. victims of intentional torts by
supervisors,' can they bring common
law tort suits against their employers
for these injuries, or are they limited to
bringing a claim under the workers'
compensation system? This question,
which arises with unfortunate reguIari·
ty, lacks a clear answer because both
state and federal courts in Illinois are
divided over the scope of the "alter
ego" exception to the exclusivity of
workers' comperuation as the remedy
for intentionally inflicted workplace
injuries.
The Illinois Workers' Compensation
Act ('1WCA") contains exclusivity pr0visions that mandate that workers'
compensation is the sole remedy available to employees for workplace
injuries. 2 There are exceptions to the
exclusivity rule, including the principle
that the rule does not apply if the injury
is not accidental.3
In Meerbrey v ~rshall Field and Co.,
Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court held
tha~ employees were barred from suing
then employers in tort for injuries
intentionally inflicted by co-workers
because such injuries were "accidental"
for purposes of the IWCA.4 The court
explained that "such injuries are unexpected and unforeseeable from the
injured employee's point of view."
More importantly, these injuries "are
also accidental from the employer's
point of view" and therefore lithe
employer has a
to consider that
the injured
s sole remedy
against the
wtllbeu.nder the
workers'
statute.

"$

pto),em
ltCtiOft5

against their co-workers for intentb'-IJJ
torts. The court found that such suits
are not barred by the exclusivity rule
because persons who committed intentional torts should not be permitted to
claim that their victims' injuries were
accidental and covered by the IWCA.'
The Meerbrey court used a similar
rationale in reaffinning two judidl!llly
created exceptions to the IWCA's
preclusion of employee suits against
employers for intentionally inflicted
injuries. Citing prior Illinois courtcled,..
sions, the court held that the exclusivity
rule would not apply where (l) the
injuries were intentionally inflicted. by
"the employer or its alter ego," or (2)
the injuries "were commanded or expressly authorized by the employer."'
The court reasoned that "the employer
"Professor Hayes thanks Professor Patrick JCeIkoy
for his valuable comments on an eerller dolt and
law student Kamran Q. Khan for his excellent
research _istsnce.
1. In this article, the term "supervi8or" will refer
generically to ~II persons with supervisory or _ agerial authority over employees, regardless of
their level of authority.
2. See 820 ILCS 305/5(a) ("No common IiIw or
statutory right to recover damages h'om the
employer... or the [employer'sl agents oremptoy_·
ees... for Injury or death sustained by M'lY ~'IIt!
while engaged in the line of his duty.lI ..cll
employee, other than the compt!NIIH:on ~.po
vided. is available to any employee who.1s~
by the provisions of this Act"); 8H~t.'GS

305/1l("The rompensatlon.heretII ~."iM
be the measure of the I'I!IIpOIWtbtlityOfId\Y~
er... for acddentallnjurles sustained by M\y.~...
. -..
ee").
3. See Collifr!l Nrg!m ~ Co... .

408 NE2d 198,202 (1980).
4. 1391l12d 455, !1M Nat 1• •

1_,<'•.

Il'Qifp!B'Il1litald to a8lel'tthat
~h'ac:ddentlll,"

and'. thereHdushre provisions of
himself committed

....'deCilk)J\ did not define

these exceptions.
eight years since
employees
itig_ted the meaning
many cases of
by supervisors,
has contended
l11aen1lor Is an "alter ego" of
that the exclusivity
nOlt'.Dltr a ,ult against the
IlUnOlls court., however,
leallt three different
.'UFEIlIU alter ego exception,
~<lliICW. below.
~.ltIor.. of the

ing any type of suJlervisor. These' decisions have found the alter ego exception applicable to, for example, three
"management employees" whose powers were not described in.the plaintiff's
complaint,12eight supervisory and managerial staffers of various rank,ll a
worker "employed ... in a supervisory
capacity,"'· a district manager,15 and a
vice president of corporate relatioos.'·
In Feliciano, Tolson, Wysong, and
Whitehead, the courts found that for
purposes of denying defendants'
motions to dismiss, the "alter ego" status of the alleged tortfeasors was sufficiently demonstrated by allegations
that they had such standard supervisory powers as the authority to discharge
employees, to mriew employee performance, and to grant vacation and sick

Ieaves.'7

"Alter Ego'"

1I.:'a _1'11e employee daimed
'llPetR)nhad harasled and
mh)l'lrlOre than 18 months in
·oo;.!d:km to allegedly
;Dank pr'actlces. Based on this
sued his
~erfj[)f.:iJltenlti011al infliction of
.deltlelS; One of the employ.....,............ that the suit was
the..·exclusi'vity provisions of

feasor has such a dominant role
stantial ownership interest In the
employer that there is a blurring of
8. Id.
9. 199111 App 3d 427, 557 NE2d 328 (1st 019110).
10. Id, 557 NE2d at 329-30.
11. Id, 557 NE2d at 332.
12. Bullilillgh v Soulh ChkllgD C""'e. IIIC., 830 F
Supp4l7. 442. 443 (NO 1111993).
13. Felit'illllo v Itrry'~ Fruit Imll C",rlle" Cellttr,
Inc., No 9J..C-591J, 1994 WL 142963, 1 (NO III April
15,1994).
14. 1bIIIOII v HHI. FillimclRl SmJim;, Inc., No. 94C·513("I995WL461883.1 (NOIIIAuR3,1995).
15. Wys{lIIg v Wmlly's lillI, IIIC., 71 PEr CII_
(BNA) 1472 (NO 111 1996).
16. Whittluwd t' AM '"",1160 F Supp 12110. 1285.
1290 (NO 1111994).
17. FclicillllO, 1994 WL 14296.1, al 3; 1111110", 1995
WL 461883, at 3: WllSO"g, 71 FEr CiI_ II 1474:
Whittluwd, 1160 P Supp at 1290.
18. 860 F 5upp al 1290.
19. 1994 WL 14296.1, al 3.
20. 63 III App 3d 908, 3110 NE2d 924 (1,;1 0
1978).

Only two of these decisions, both by
Judge Norg1e of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois,
offered any rationale for the conclusion
tha t all supervisors are alter egos of ABOUT THE AUTHORS
their employer. In Whitehead, the court
noted that the seminal decision,
Tohnson, had not explained why the
bank managers were alter egos. The
court then provided its own explanation: "[WJhere the employer is a fictitious person, i.e., corporate entity, and
its authorities and powers are necessarily delegated to supervisors to conduct
the corporate business, the supervisors
act as alter egos of the corporate
Michael J. Hayes has been an assistant
entity."'·
Similarly, in Feliciano, the court rea- professor of law at Southern Illinois
soned that where the empioyer is a "fic- University School of Law in Carbondale
titious person," like a corporation, since 1995. Previously, he practiced labor
"powers are necessarily delegated to and employment law in Washington, D.C.
for seven years. He received his B.S. from
managers to conduct the corporate Cornell University in 1985 and his J.D.
business" and so those managers may from the University of Virginia in
be alter egos of the corporation. I.
1988.
Under these precedents that broadly
interpret the alter ego exception, an
employee's showing that the person
who committed the intentional tort
possessed standard· sUp.i!rvisory powers is sufficient to overcome the exclusivity ofthelWCAand to permit the
employee to bring a common law
action against his or her employer.

B. ThI SM,*"

I""~tfJti(J"':

Under the~tion 01 alter ego between employee and COI'BOrate"
adopted in TtlbIortski,most supervisors employer that has been UlIlICICU
would not be covered by the alter ego a1ter-ego mncept.HIII
Both Damato v Tack P""'n CIIerJmIet
exception. The .qUotations from Lanon
repeatedly distinguiJh between "gen_ Ceo, Inc. and Al-Dabbtlgh v G~I
Inc. relied on lengthyquotesftom
Jablonski and the Larson treatise m.
explaining why the alter ego exception
offered
did not apply.29In an unpublished dedsion in 1996, the seventh circuit also
employed the JIIblonski standard in rulto the conflict
ing that the alter ego exception did not
the altar ego
apply.:IOIn 1997, the seventh circuit
again appeared to apply the strict inter.x~.Underthe
pretation of alter ego when it held,
01Stm8n standard,
without elaboration, that a "head
supervisor" did not possess "sul&ient
stature"
to be the employer's alter ego.11
deemed an alter ego
Thus, in contrast to the Johnson line
If .... or ..... ·ha. 'the
01 cases discussed in the previous section, the decisions applying the
authorItY to make
Jablonski definition of alter ego have
decision. and set
held that the alter ego exception to
exclusivity applies only in very limited
policy
behalf of
cim.unstances.

•Ctssrnan...

suits against
<fQr;'inttmtic>nal torts by suIM'CD\I1n declared that the
the rule which

a senslDleresolutlon

over

an individual II

on

the empIoyer.' and
thus 'speakS for
the company.'·

uine alter egos" and "mere supervisor'S." Moreover, the reference, in the
second passage from Larson, to the
ordinary corporate law standards on
alter ego suggests a particularly narrow
definition of that roncept. In corporate
law, the alter ego doctrine applies only
when there is "such unity of interest or
ownership that the individual and corporation are, for all practical purposes,
coextensive."lI6 Thus, under the standard set forth in the Larson treatise,
and adopted in /tfbIomJki, the alter ego
exception would apply only in unusual
cim.unstances.
Since the alter ego exception was
reaffirmed by the Meerbrey decision in
1990, several dedsions in DIinois have
relied on./IrbIfmski·and the Lanon treatisein stridIy:1imiting that exception.
One striking examPle is Joyce v HHL
Finncild sm,;m,'II in -which .the court

found· that

that· the tortfea..
~with

promote, dis·

C. A MiMk GtoIl,",: TIre Crissman
Decision
In Crissman v Healthco InttrnlltioMl,
21. Arthur Larson .. Lex Larson, l.IIrlHlII
WorkMtn's COMpenu/ion l.IIw (Matthew Bender

1996).
22. 380 NE2d at 926.
23. kI,380 NE2d at 9'0 (quoting Arthur lAnon.
2A 7lIt Urw of NIrkIIItn's Co/nptIIsIIlion Urw § 68.21)
(emphasis added).
24. 217 Ad< 350. 230 SW2d 28 (1950).
25, 380 NE2d at 927 (quoting Arthur lA.-.
2A NIrkIIItn's Co/nptIIsII/ion Urw § 68.22) (emphasis
added).
26. Fmdtlich v ,.R. Froelich Mfg. Co .• 93 In App
3d 179,416 NE2d 1134. 1137 (1st D 1981).
'rI. No 94-C-5357, 1995 WL 215169 (ND III
April 10. 1995).
28. 1995 WL 215169 at 3.
29. 0. ..../0. 927 F Supp 283, 291-92 (ND HI
1996); N-DIIIJNgII, 873 F Supp 1105. 1113-14 (NO •
1994). In A'-~. the court ~ thiltdte
tortt-w did not even have a ~or_
agement role, but stn!sMd in a foolRoIe . . . tNs
oIMervation Hshould not be IIIiIuftdentood
gestins that IddsJ type of low Ie'ft!I stl!t\lll _ _ __

as ....

ponte hleran:hy... would IIIUftke to It'i:IIIP!r . . . .
nIIIpOIISiblIity for the corponItion. 8Y3 p 9IW itt
H

111409.
30. CHkfIin " """-Mart ~ hie., Nus ~
and 9S-ZS14, 1996 WL 12B.t (fth Or . . '" . . .
Uader the NIea of the IMM!Mh ~. lift•••.
IIshed dedsioft ~ ~ be'~ .~ .•..
deftt.
.... c '
31.
".11'1 Ilion
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Judge Rovner
position that
the corporate
iUit·.be··.virtuaJllv one and the
Rovner

interpretation 01 thel.ter ego exception
was inapproprUate.becaWieacorporation couId<be.~tebom its·owners
under theltrkt~tetegoSWldani "and
yet take purpoflcmalactionswhich are
injurious to theb'employees."fl
P.Icking up orrProfeSsor Larson's WIe
of the term l'rea1iatkally maIter ego,"
Judge Rovner propo$ed a "realistic and
prlctical appraisaJ"of which persons
should be deemed alter egos.42 Judge
Rovner reasoned that "Isltatus as a
'foreman, supervisor, or mlnager'
alone" was not sufficient to make an
individual an alter ego, if that individuallacked poJicymIking authority.43 But
where In individual has "the authority
to make decisionslnd set policy on
behalf of an employer," then that individual could reaJistiailly be regarded as
the employer's alter ego. Accordingly,
Judge Rovner found that "when the
tortfeasor holds a position in which he,
in a practical sense, speaks for the company, he may be. deemed the employer's alter ego for purposes of the
Workers' Compensation Act.""
Judge Rovner then explained that,
under this "realistic and practical"
approach, more than one person may
be deemed a company's alter ego. For
example, Judge Rovner stated, "To the
extent that each of Healthco's seven
regional managers had final decisionmaking authority with respect to the
policies and procedures within his or
her region...eachmay qualify as an alter
ego."45 Judge Rovner added that "Itlhe
same might arguably be said at the
level of branches and branch managers...." The key was whether the individual had "authority" to deliver the
employer's "final word" in his or her
sphere.... If so, then that individual
would qualify .slmalter ego.
Judge Rovner found that another
fador supporting application of the
exc:epl:iOO inCrissmmr was that
aUn:e!dltotlts involved recurrent

33.
34.
35.

Id al 73.000.
Id al 72,999-73.000.
Judge Rovner, who now aervllllllll a _enth
cin:uit appellate justice, decided CrissmlllI when she
wala federal district rourt judge.
36. Crissmal/, 60 Empl Prac Dec (CCH) at
73.000.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id at 73.001.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id (quoting Arthur Lal'!lOn, 2A Workmert'S
Compellilltimtl.llW § 68.21).
... Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id at 73.001-73,002.
48. Id at 73,003.
49. Id.

TRADEMARK

It COPYRIGHT SEARCHFS
Supply word and/or
plus goods or services.

lU\Jl.Ir.lMllIU\. -

I ~J:!.IU!l.LJt"I

FEES:

COMBINED SEARCH - $260

(U.s .• State. and Espanded Common Law)

U.S. TRADEMARKOFFICE-$120
STATE TRADEMARK - $125
EXPANDED COMMON LAW· $J65
DESIGNS - $145 per U.S. class (minimum)
COPYRIGHT - $155
PATENT SEARCH· $390 (minimum)

INTERNATIONAL SEARCHING
DOCUMENT PItEPAltATlON

(lOr attorneys only - applications, Section 8
&: J 5, Aasipmenu. renewals.)

RF.SEA.RCH-(SEC • ·tOK's, ICCFC:C.
COUKfRECORDS,·CONGRESS.)

The onltyr'atic)na)e

offeredfot·.the

Alberts, and Reynolds, the
01'1rCriR!~1ft;2t1

in consider.tolrUI!aSOr"s decisional
n>t'1In'IPnt nature of
~•. injfinc:jling
the plain... u . . . . ' " alter ego

that"cm'J'()rationtlnust act through
their supervisors" -is . untenable.
Under that rationale, .the alter ego
exception should not be limited to
supervisors I.)ecauaeOOrporations delegatefurictions to, and "ad through," all
t:heIrempio)tees.By contrast, the rationale appanmtiyexcludes non-corporate
entities, such as partnerships and proprietorships,from the alter ego exception, even though the$e entities also
delegate powers to supervisors and
other employees. There i. no logical
reason why the employer's form of
organization should so greatly impact
whether it can be sued in tort for the
intentional acts of its employees.
The strict interpretation of alter ego,
however, is too narrow. As was discussed in Section II, the strict interpretation derives from the Larson treatise
on workers' 1:ompensation. But even
the Larson tr~atise recognizes that
exclusivity should not apply where the
injury is inflicted by employer policymilkers. In the section following the section on alter ego, the Larson treatise
notes that the "unpremeditated
assaults" by supervisors discussed in
preceding sections "could not conceivably be said to have any content of corporate or employer policy."S< Relying
on this point in the Larson treatise,
another commentator has asserted,
"When ... an injury is intended and
effectuated through a deliberate managerial decision by those with corporate

decision-milking responsibility and authority rtgrlrdingsuch matters, a strong argument can be made for allowing a tort
claim."S5
In Crissman, Judge Rovner offered a
sensible resolution' to the conflict over
the al
exception. Under the
Crissman
an individual is
deemed
ego if he or she has
make decisionsahd
employer,"
thl~5~~~ik$rotthe·tOrtil~rl~lI~

apply in cases

itse1fcommitted the inlllI\tkNl.tOJjt.
It is reasonable and fair
Crissman standard does, I.l'N'''.''''''_.•
tort is committed byakey QiUiBi;.
maker of an.empIoyer, it.istruJY
mitted by the employer. Moreover;
Judge Rovner emphasized,
Crissman standard. is baaed.ona "_...1.."'-,
tic and practical appraisal" ofwhaflt
means to be an alter ego of an employer.
For these reasons, the state and rederal courts of Illinois should uniformly
adopt the Crissman standan:l for defining the alter ego exception to workers'
compensation exclusivity. Then, the
workers of Illinois would know with
greater certainty whether they can go
to court to Obtain relief for intentional
torts in the workplace. .qz.

so. See, for example, Dllllio v Common_IIII
Edison, 938 P Supp 1388 (NO ill 1996); ROWOIn v
GoII/1eb MtI'IlOri41 Hospillll, No 95-<:-6515, 1996 WL
131716 (NO III Mar 20, 1996); Alberls v Wickes
Lumber Co .. No 93-<:-4397, 1995 WL 476654 (NO m
Aug 9, 1995); ~ v Illinois Bell TIIlepIKme Co., No
93-<:·5194, 1994 WL 194228 (NO III May 16, 1994);
Reynolds v Hi/llchi Stiki USA, Inc., No 92-<:-8281,
1993 WL 384535 (NO III Sept 28,1993); Ken",q1J
Frilsch, No 9O-C-5446, 1993 WL 761979 (NO mMar
I, 1993) (report of Executive Magistrate Judse
Lefkow) .
51. Rowlln, 1996 WL 131716 at 2 (quoting
Crissllllln, 60 Empl Prac Dec (CCH), at 73.(01).
52. Wood, 1994 WL 194228 at 3 (quoting
Crissllllln, 60 Empl Prac Dec (CCH), at 73.(01).
53. Kennedy, 1993 WL 761979 at 10; Albms.l995
WL 476654 at 5; R£yno/ds, 1993 WL 384535 at 3.
54. Arthur Larson, 2A Larson's Workers'
Compe!lSlltion lRw at § 68.23.
55. Joseph King, Tile Exclusiveness
Ilfl
Employee's Wf1rkers' Compensalion Remedy AgIffltst
His Employer. 55 Tenn L Rev 405, 450 and n219
(1988) (citing Arthur Larson. 2A Workmew'$
Compe!lSlllwn lRw § 68.23).
56. Crissmlln. 60 Empl Prac DeC (CCH).1:
73,001. As was discussed earlier. some peatCrissllllln decisions have In!ated Crissmlmas
Iishing a rwo-prong standard that
both
authority of the tortfeasor 11M
rth~"".........
is recurrent in natuJe. The
prong is mispI/K:'ed. AJthoosh the ro.,""'~r-."""iiIo··.
did rely on the repeated natuJe
finding the alter
exception
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